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[T]he day may come when television will have become so
commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average per-
son as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in
courtrooms may disparage the judicial process.'
Justice Harlan wrote these words in his concur-
ring opinion in the landmark case of Estes v. Texas,
in which the Supreme Court found that the obtrusive
presence of the media in a courtroom jeopardized the
defendant's right to a fair trial.' In light of the pub-
lic's increasing reliance on the electronic media as its
primary source of information, the day has arrived
for the Supreme Court to re-examine the constitu-
tionality of cameras in the courtroom and to contem-
plate unlocking its doors to the electronic media.'
Technological advancements have eliminated many
of the potential dangers to the truth-finding function
and sanctity of courtroom proceedings that existed at
the time the ban was instituted." However, state and
federal courts disagree about their policies concern-
ing the presence of the electronic media. While many
dangers to the judicial process have been eliminated,
the appetite of the media to pursue sensational cases
with an overwhelming momentum has not
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 595-6 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Id.; see text, infra part I.B.
8 David Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV,
Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the
Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 785, 788 n.25 (1993)
(discussing the public's reliance upon the television media for
information) (citing Elliot Slotnick, Television News and the Su-
preme Court: A Case Study, 77 JUDICATURE 21, 22 (1993)).
4 See Harris, supra note 3, at 804; see also Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1981)(acknowledging the contin-
uing advancements in technology since the implementation of the
ban on cameras in federal courtrooms).
" The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make
diminished.
This Comment examines the struggle of courts to
resolve the underlying tensions and competing inter-
ests of the press' First Amendment right to access,5
and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial.' Part I traces the development and expansion
of the right to access through the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the First Amendment. Part II ex-
amines recent state court decisions granting the press
access to trial proceedings in the absence of a sub-
stantial harm. Part III evaluates the United States
Judicial Conference's recent decision to uphold the
absolute ban in the federal court system. Part IV dis-
cusses the disparity between the court systems' views
regarding cameras in the courtroom. Further, Part
IV examines the value and growing popularity of
Court TV. This Comment concludes that the diver-
gence in the state and federal court systems' policies
on access is unwarranted, and, therefore, the
mandatory closure of federal courtrooms violates the
First Amendment right of the press to have access to,
and broadcast, courtroom proceedings.
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
6 The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
I. PRIOR HISTORY: RECOGNIZING THE
RIGHT TO ACCESS AND DEFINING ITS
SCOPE
The ban on cameras in the courtroom can be
traced back to the sensational Lindbergh baby kid-
napping case of 1935.7 The media relentlessly pur-
sued the story, causing the case to gain worldwide
notoriety.' The media's constant and disruptive pres-
ence in the courtroom threatened the defendant's
constitutional right to receive a fair trial.' Bruno
Hauptmann, the defendant charged with the murder
of the baby, was tried before a judge in a court of
law, as well. as before the public in a circus-like
arena created by the press.'0 Hence, the media
frenzy surrounding this case sparked the debate on
the constitutional right of the press to have access to
trials.
A. Canon 3A(7): A Judicial Response
The detrimental impact upon the defendant's right
to a fair trial compelled the American Bar Associa-
' State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 827-828 (N.J. 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). Bruno Hauptmann was con-
victed of first degree murder for killing the baby of Colonel
Charles Lindbergh. Hauptmann kidnapped the baby, Charles
Jr., from the Lindbergh home and held him for a ransom of
$50,000. Although the money was delivered, the baby's body
was found months later in a shallow grave. Id. at 813.
1 Over 700 members of the press; including newspaper re-
porters and photographers, telegraph operators, and messengers,
gathered from all over the world to cover the trial. See Albert H.
Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial in Light of English Criminal
Procedure, 21 A.B.A. J. 301, 304 (1935); Laralyn M. Sasaki,
Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms: A Judicial Re-
sponse, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REV. 769, 773 n.25 (1990).
* The trial judge allowed the installation of one motion pic-
ture camera but forbade the taking of pictures while the court
was in session. Hauptmann, 180 A. at 827-28. Contrary to such
instructions, the cameraman operated the camera during the trial
without the judge's knowledge. Richard P. Lindsey, An Assess-
ment of the Use of Cameras in State and Federal Courts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 389, 389 n.2 (1984). Although the court acknowledged
that messenger boys and clerks employed by the press were run-
ning about the courtroom, the appellate court refused to grant a
mistrial on the grounds that the press caused confusion and dis-
order in the courtroom. The court declared that the press and
the public were entitled to the daily happenings of the trial.
Hauptmann, 180 A. at 827-28.
'o At the beginning of the opinion, the court noted the "exis-
tence of great popular excitement before and throughout the
trial, and of a crowded courtroom at all stages of the case."
Hauptmann, 180 A. at 813.
" In the Appendix to his concurring opinion in Estes, Jus-
tice Harlan cites the amicus curiae brief of the American Bar
Association which noted that the "Special Committee on Coop-
tion ("ABA") to act in order to preserve the essential
fairness 'of the justice system." In 1937, the House
of Delegates adopted Canon 35 of the Judicial Ca-
nons of Ethics, barring all still photography. and
cameras from courtrooms. 2 The Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances later amended Ca-
non 35 and widened the ban to encompass all televi-
sion coverage.' The Judicial Conference of the
United States instituted the Judicial Codes of Ethics,
mandating closure to shield all federal courtrooms
from the broadcast media.'4
The Judicial Canons of Ethics served as a model
for state and federal rules, and although not binding,
were heavily persuasive upon courts in the formula-
tion of judicial standards of decorum.' A majority of
the states voluntarily adopted Canon 35 or promul-
gated similar regulations permitting limited access.'
In contrast, the ban on cameras from federal courts
became absolute by the adoption of the Canon 3A(7)
by the Judicial Conference, barring media coverage
of civil and criminal trials in the federal court sys-
tem. 1 The prohibition is reinforced by Rule 53 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which ex-
eration Between Press, Radio and Bar . . . had expressed its
grave concern with the dangers attendant upon the use of radio
in connection with trials, particularly in light of the spectacular
publicity and broadcast of the trial of Bruno Hauptmann.'" Es-
tes, 381 U.S. at 596, 587 n.1.
2 62 A.B.A. REP. 1134-35 (1937). On September 30, 1937,
the House of Delegates adopted Judicial Canon 35. The original
version read:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dig-
nity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the
courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses be-
tween sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings
are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the
proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions
with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should
not be permitted.
Judicial Canon 35.
a' 77 A.B.A. REP. 607, 607-11 (1952).
14 MOLLY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, ELECTRONIC ME-
DIA COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUA-
TION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN SIX DISTRICT COURTS AND
Two COURTS OF APPEALS 3 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Report].
158 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 535; Sasaki, supra note 9 at 773
(discussing implementation of the Codes of Judicial Conduct).
16 See Estes, 381 U.S. at 532.
" ABA-Judicial Code of Conduct Canon 3A(7)(1985). Ca-
non 3A(7) states that:
[A] judge may authorize, broadcasting, televising, record-
ing, and photographing of judicial proceedings in court-
rooms. . . consistent with the rights of, the parties and
subject to express conditions . . . which allow such cover-
age in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract
the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with
the administration of justice.
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pressly bans the electronic media coverage from all
criminal proceedings in the federal court system.18
Since its inception, the absolute ban on electronic
media coverage has endured constant attacks on its
validity and constitutionality. The courts have con-
sistently refused to unwrap the protective cloak from
federal courtrooms, and have continued to deny the
press access to both civil and criminal trials.19
B. ' Estes v. Texas: Recognizing A Right to Access
The increasing intensity of the struggle between
the competing interests of the press and of the ac-
cused reached a culmination in 1965 in Estes v.
Texas. In this case of first impression, the Supreme
Court addressed the issues as to whether the First
Amendment's right to access encompassed the right
to televise courtroom proceedings, and whether the
media coverage threatened the defendant's right to a
fair trial."0 In determining the constitutionality of
the exclusion of cameras, the Supreme Court found
that the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial out-
weighed the media's right to access,"1 and further
held that there was no constitutional right to televise
judicial proceedings.22
While recognizing the disparity between state and
federal courts, the Court prohibited the use of cam-
eras in federal courtrooms to guarantee the funda-
mental fairness of the trial. The Court declared that
Today, most states have adopted Canon 3A(7) or have incorpo-
rated its principles in their statutory regulations.
is FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. Rule 53 provides that: "the taking of
photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial
proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from
the court room shall not be permitted by the court."
19 See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984)(holding that the prohibition on
televising the trial is constitutional, even where both parties con-
sented to televising the trial); Legi-Tech v. Keifer, 601 F Supp.
371 (N.Y. Dist. 1984)(holding that a constitutional challenge to
Rule 53 cannot be upheld on the basis of a Sixth Amendment
violation); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.
1983)(finding a general consensus among the courts to uphold a
standard to exclude cameras from federal courtrooms).
0 Estes, 381 U.S. at 535-40. Because of the extensive pub-
licity surrounding his indictment for swindling, Estes made a
motion to exclude the media from his trial. The Court denied
Estes' original motion. However, the Court was compelled by
the defendant's continual objections and the intrusive presence of
the media to proscribe restrictions to limit the actions of the
press, thereby prohibiting the broadcasting of large portions of
the trial. The Court held that the intrusive presence of the elec-
tronic media infringed upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial and warranted a reversal of his conviction.
Id. at 538-52.
21 Id. at 538-52.
"to ascertain the truth is the primary objective of the
trial process, and is a goal which must be maintained
at all costs."'2 8 While the press should be given free-
dom to perform its valuable function of providing in-
formation to the public, the court indicated that "its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the mainte-
nance of absolute fairness of the judicial process.'
'
12
The Court premised the ban on the inherent
prejudice and the potential detriment created by the
presence of the cameras upon jurors, witnesses,
judges, defendants, and the courtroom decorum.28
The primary concern was that the jury would be
distracted by cameras and this would directly effect
the jury's ultimate decision of guilt or innocence.26
The issue of whether Estes interprets the Constitu-
tion as imposing an absolute ban on cameras has
caused much confusion.27 Many courts have relied
upon Justice Harlan's concurrence to determine the
scope of the opinion.28 In concurring that there is no
constitutional right to televise trial proceedings, Jus-
tice Harlan stressed that the right to a public trial is
"not one belonging to the public, but one to the ac-
cused, and inhering in the constitutional process by
which justice is administered. 12 9 However, the lan-
guage of the opinion suggests that the ban is not ab-
solute because the issue may be "subject to re-exami-
nation" upon the evolution of the electronic media
and the elimination of the risks its current presence
poses to the judicial system.30
2 Id. at 535. The Court described the courtroom as having
massive amounts of cables and wires all over the courtroom floor
and microphones on the judge's bench, the jury box, and counsel
table. The activities of the media created considerable disrup-
tions to the hearing. Id. at 536.
22 Id. at 540.
24 Id. at 539.
28 Id. at 545. The Court was concerned that the quality of
the testimony would be impaired and its accuracy undermined
and that an additional burden would be placed upon the presid-
ing judge. The impact on the witness was deemed incalculable,
potentially causing them to over-dramatize or re-shape their tes-
timony. Id. at 544. The presence of the media was disruptive to
such an extreme degree as to warrant an objection by defense
when one photographer attempted to photograph the page of the
paper which Estes was reading from at the counsel table. Id. at
538.
26 Id. at 544-50. The Court noted that "practical experience
tells us that a televised juror feels the pressures of being looked
at throughout the course of the proceedings. The juror's eye is
fixed upon the camera and its mind is preoccupied with the tele-
casting rather than the testimony." Id. at 546.
27 See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), see also
discussion, infra part I.D.
8 Estes, 381 U.S. at 587-91.
29 Id. at 595.
20 Id. at 532.
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C. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia: The
Tradition of Accessibility
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the consti-
tutional right of the public and the press to attend
trials in Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia."1
The Court held that the First Amendment implicitly
guarantees the right to access. 2 The Court examined
the public character of the trial process, tracing it
back to its origins in the English justice system
before the days of the Norman Conquest." The me-
dia was seen as a "surrogate" for the public by in-
forming them of the legal system, thereby bolstering
public confidence and enhancing the "integrity and
quality of the proceedings."'" The opportunity af-
forded to the public to better comprehend and to
scrutinize the operations of the legal system ensures
the fair administration of justice and indicates the
significance of the presumption of openness to a
democratic government."
The Court determined that the First Amendment
rights are subject to limitations imposed by judicial
discretion in the interest of the fair administration of
justice." To deter arbitrary closures, the Court con-
cluded that if the party opposing access fails to artic-
ulate an overriding interest, then the presumption of
openness is not rebutted and the trial must be open
31 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The defendant, Stevenson was con-
victed of second degree murder. The court reversed his convic-
tion on the grounds of an improper introduction of evidence. Af-
ter this reversal and two subsequent mistrials, the issue of
whether the press and public have a right to attend criminal tri-
als arose. At the commencement of the fourth trial, the court
granted the defendant's motion for closure of the proceedings,
predicated upon the request of a family member of the deceased.
The appellants, reporters from Richmond Newspapers, sought
to vacate the order, arguing that the constitutional rights of the
press prevented closure without an opportunity to explore alter-
native means of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decisions and
ruled in favor of the appellants. Id. at 555-60.
" Id. at 580.
I d. at 564-75.
Id. at 566-604. The significance of openess is further en-
hanced by the public's right to be informed. The Court classifies
a trial as a public event and a courtroom as a public place. Id. at
574. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 467, 474 (1947)(holding
that because a trial is a public event, the events that transpire
there are public property).
"' Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574. The Court em-
phasized that "public access to trial serves an important prophy-
lactic purpose by enhancing the understanding of substantive
and procedural issues of the legal system." Id. at 577. The Court
held that public trials have significant therapeutic value for the
community by providing an outlet for concern. The effect of
public attendance strengthens the confidence in judicial remedies
and increases the respect for the law, an essential ingredient to a
to the public.8 7 The Court did not address the issue
as to whether the right to access extends to civil
proceedings."
D. Chandler v. Florida: Acknowledging the States'
Authority to Consent
The proposals of the ABA Committee on Fair
Trial-Free Press to revise Canon 3A(7) propelled
the use of cameras in the courtroom to the forefront
of legal issues in 1978." * As a result, state courts
became empowered to authorize the promulgation of
standards and guidelines to permit limited access and
media coverage of courtroom proceedings.40 Demys-
tifying the cloud of vagueness that had hovered over
the right to access since Estes, the Supreme Court in
Chandler v. Florida, held that the Constitution
neither imposes an absolute ban on cameras from
courtrooms and nor bars state experimentation with
electronic media coverage.4"
The basic principles of federalism limit the scope
of the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction over
state courts and restrict its authority to intervene
only in situations where state action violated the
Constitution.' 2 Where one party shows that the elec-
tronic media coverage of a trial constitutes a denial
democratic society. Id. at 570.
80 Id. at 574.
I7 d. at 598.
a Federal courts do not distinguish between civil and crimi-
nal trials in determining the presumption of openess. See Pub-
licker Industry v. David Cohen Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,
733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984)(holding that the public and
press have a clear First Amendment and common law right of
access to civil proceedings.); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d
1623 (2d Cir. 1984)(holding that the First Amendment secures a
right of access to civil proceedings).
9 The Committee proposed to allow the electronic media to
provide coverage of the courtroom proceedings, conditioned upon
statutory regulations and judicial discretion. The coverage was to
be carried out unobtrusively, without disturbing the decorum of
the courtroom. The House of Delegates ultimately rejected the
proposals in 1979. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 564 n.3.
40 Id. at 564. By a vote of 44 to 1, the Conference of State
Chief Justices passed a resolution to allow the highest court of
each state to promulgate standards and guidelines regulating ra-
dio, television, and other photographic coverage of court proceed-
ings. Id. at 564 n.4.
41 Id. at 573-84. The Court found that the defendant's right
to a fair trial was not compromised by the presence of the elec-
tronic media. The defendant failed to demonstrate with specific-
ity that the ability of the jury to adjudicate impartially was
tainted or that the participants in the proceeding were adversely
impacted by its the presence of the media. Id. at 573-84.
42 Id. at 570, 580.
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of Due Process and impedes to the fair administra-
tion of justice, Supreme Court intervention may be
warranted.43 The Supreme Court recognized the
right of states to consent to electronic media coverage
of judicial proceedings, but neither endorsed nor in-
validated the presence of the electronic media." The
circumscribed regulations safeguard the fundamental
fairness of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
by authorizing the presiding judge to limit, deny, or
terminate all broadcast coverage or photography in
courtrooms.' 5 In light of recent advancements in
technology that have substantially decreased poten-
tial dangers to the fair administration of justice, the
mere presence of the broadcasting media has not
been found to be inherently adverse to the judicial
process and, alone, is insufficient to warrant an abso-
lute bar."6
E. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: Qual-
ifying the Right To Access
In Globe Newspaper ,. Superior Court,"7 the Su-
preme Court held that the right to access, although
implicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment, is
not absolute.'" To justify the closure, a party must
show "that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
4S Id. at 569, 583.
4 Id. at 582.
5 Id. at 566. The guidelines set forth by the Florida Su-
preme Court specify the kind of equipment to be used and the
manner in which it is to be operated. The guidelines state that:
(1) no more than one television camera and only one television
operator are allowed; (2) pooling arrangements must be ar-
ranged when more than one media organization seeks coverage;
(3) artificial lighting is prohibited; (4) equipment must be in a
fixed location and may not be moved during the trial; (5) vide-
otaping equipment must be remote from the courtroom; (6) film,
videotape, and lenses may not be changed while the court is in
session; (7) no audio recordings of conferences between lawyers,
parties and counsel, or at the bench are permitted; (8) the judge
has sole and plenary discretion to exclude coverage of certain
witnesses; and (9) the jury may not be filmed. Id.
46 Id. at 573, 574.
47 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
48 Id. at 604-6. The state statute granted to judges presiding
over sexual offense cases the power to clear the courtroom dur-
ing the testimony of victims who are 18 years of age or younger.
MASSACHUSETTs GEN. LAWS ANN., ch 278, §16 A (West
1981). In.Globe, the Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts
statute violated the First Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the commencement
of the rape trial, Globe Newspapers made a motion to the court
to revoke its order of closure and grant them access to the hear-
ing. Even though the victims waived "whatever rights [they
might] have [had]to exclude the press," the Supreme Judicial
serve that interest."49 Exclusion of the electronic me-
dia is determined by the circumstances of each
case."0 Therefore, the Court concluded that a com-
pelling interest, in and of itself, does not justify a
mandatory closure rule. 1  However, the Court
warned that its invalidation of a statute mandating
closure did not establish an absolute ban against
exclusion.".
The Court broadly interpreted the First Amend-
ment in light of the First Amendment's underlying
purpose to protect the free discussion of governmen-
tal affairs."3 The Court indicated that the media's
role as a watchdog against judicial impropriety was
essential to the proper functioning of the justice sys-
tem, promoting public confidence and ensuring par-
ticipation in the government and informed discus-
sions of governmental affairs.54
F. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cali-
fornia: The Logic-Experience Test
In Press- Enterprise Co. ,. Superior Court of Cal-
ifornia,55 the Supreme Court formulated a standard
to assist courts in determining when the qualified
right of access attaches to a proceeding, and what
circumstances demand closure. 6 Before the First
Amendment right attaches, the particular proceeding
Court of Massachusetts reaffirmed the closure, justifying it upon
the furtherance of "genuine State interests." Globe Newspaper,
457 U.S. at 596, 598-602.
49 Id. at 607.
50 Id. at 609. "The need for closure is to determined on a
case by case basis. In order for this approach to be effective,
'representatives of the press and general public must be given the
opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion.'" Id.
at 609 n.23 (quoting Gannet Co., 443 U.S. at 401).
51 Id. at 606-11.
6 Id. at 611 n.27.
5 Id. at 604.
51 Id. at 604-11. The Court states that openness "enhances
the quality an safeguards the integrity of the fact finding pro-
cess." Id. at 606.
65 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
6 Id. at 3-7. This case intended the First Amendment right
of access to trial proceedings to apply to preliminary hearing.
Robert Diaz, a nurse charged with murdering twelve of his pa-
tients, motioned for closure of his trial because of the risk of
prejudice of pretrial publicity. Due to the extensive and over-
whelming publicity surrounding the case, the Magistrate ordered
closure to preserve the constitutional right to a fair and impartial
trial. Petitioners motioned the Superior Court of California to.release the preliminary hearing transcript of the closed proceed-
ing. The Court held that a "conclusory assertion" of potential
prejudicial publicity could not overcome the First Amendment
right of access. Id. at 3-7, 15.
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must have a tradition of public access and a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of justice system,
otherwise known as the logic and experience test.
517
If the "logic and experience" test is satisfied, the ac-
cess cannot be denied unless there is a specific show-
ing that "closure is essential to preserve higher val-
ues and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."58
When balancing the respective constitutional
rights, the Court indicated that the public right to
attend trials is not necessarily inconsistent with the
defendant's right to a fair trial. " Both parties view
it as a means for achieving the common objective of
the assurance of a fair trial.60 If the Sixth Amend-
ment right of the accused is the interest asserted, the
moving party must specifically demonstrate that
there is a substantial probability that the defendant's
fair trial rights "will- be prejudiced by publicity that
closure would prevent" and that the right to a fair
trial could not be adequately protected by reasonable
alternatives to closure. 1 The Court held that the risk
of prejudicial publicity did not mandate closure of
the trial proceeding.62
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Growing Presence Of Cameras In State
Courtrooms
Since Chandler v. Florida, the electronic media
has consistently battled to gain access to courtroom
proceedings.6" Today, forty-seven states have un-
locked the doors to their courtrooms, allowing the
broadcast media to enter." However, as previously
57 Id. at 6-11. The test set forth by the Court is often re-
ferred to as the "logic and experience" test. The "experience"
standard was first established in Richmond Newspapers, supra,
where the tradition of access was found to "impl[y] the favorable
judgment of experience." Id. at 6-11. The "logic" standard was
established in Globe Newspaper, supra, where the "significant
positive role" of public access was considered. Press Enterprise,
478 U.S. at 8.
8 Press Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 14-16.
59 Id. at 6.
60 Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 476 U.S. 39 (1984)(holding
that the explicit right to a fair trial is no less protective of a
public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of access)).
* Id. at 14.
62 Id. at 14, 15.
68 After Chandler, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, and Wyoming have allowed the electronic media to
broadcast courtroom proceedings on a permanent basis, subject
to statutory limitations. Eight other states have introduced cam-
eras on an experimental basis, five of which have extended their
experimental rules indefinitely. Todd Piccus, Demystifying the
stated, the right of access is not absolute. Most states
have adopted Canon 3A(7) of the Judicial Code of
Conduct or have incorporated Canon 3A(7)'s sub-
stantive contents in its provisions, conditioning access
upon statutory limitations and judicial discretion. In
exercising their authority, judges may regulate, ter-
minate, and deny access in order to ensure the fair
administration of justice.
65
Courts have struggled to define the scope of acces-
sibility and to balance the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair and impartial trial with the
press' First Amendment right of access to judicial
proceedings. Although many state courts have con-
sented to the presence of electronic media, the nar-
rowness of the restrictions vary among them. Some
states prohibit the recording of courtroom proceed-
ings unless the court consents in writing.66 In con-
trast, other states allow access unless the moving
party satisfies a heavy burden of showing a demon-
strable and actual harm. 7 Still other states bar ac-
cess upon a timely objection made by or on behalf of
a participant to the proceeding, in accordance with
judicial discretion.68
1. Substantial Showing of Harm or Prejudice
At one extreme, states have instituted statutes
granting trial judges great discretion in conditioning
access and establishing a higher standard to be met
to justify closure. In these jurisdictions, state courts
require that an actual showing of prejudice or harm
result from the electronic media coverage to render a
trial unfair. In Commonwealth v. Cross,6 9 the Mas-
Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to
Broadcast Media, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1053, 1063 n.58.
6' Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, and the District of
Columbia have upheld the absolute ban on cameras in their
courtrooms. Id. at 1064 n.63.
68 See discussion, supra part I D-F; Piccus, supra note 63,
at 1064.
6 See e.g., CAL CT. R. 980. Rule 980 (b) states that "film
or media coverage is permitted only on written order of the
court." Rule 980(b)(1). See also Marin Independent Journal v.
Municipal Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1712 (1993)(holding that
courtroom bailiff's nonverbal "nod and wink" did not constitute
an official approval of petitioner's request to photograph the
proceedings).
67 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cross, infra, note 69 and ac-
companying text.
6 See e.g. State v. Smith, 863 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1993). Ca-
non 3A(7) grants to presiding judges the power to authorize the
broadcasting of proceedings, provided that a timely objection
made by a party can preclude the broadcast. ARK. CODE OF JU-
DICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7).
69 605 N.E.2d 298 (Mass. 1992).
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sachusetts Court of Appeals affirmed the press' right
to broadcast a courtroom proceeding on the basis of
the accused's failure to show that the presence of the
media adversely impacted or created a substantial
harm to the party's court proceedings.7 0 The ob-
jecting party has the burden of demonstrating that a
"substantial likelihood of harm to any person or any
harmful consequence would result from the presence
of television cameras in the courtroom. '71  A mere
objection of jury distraction and of interference with
the orderly presentation of evidence does not warrant
closure.72 Courts have held that, although an inher-
ent risk of juror prejudice exists "in any publication
of trial, . . . something more than juror awareness
that the trial is such as to attract the attention of
broadcasters" must be demonstrated. If the moving
party does not satisfy this burden, the judge will not
deny the electronic media's access to the courtroom. 
7
The Cross court, in dictum, suggests the use of ad-
ditional safeguards to reduce potential jury distrac-
tion.75 For example, a court may specifically instruct
the jury, prior to the commencement of the trial, to
inform the court if the presence of television cameras
hinders the jury's ability to render a fair and impar-
tial verdict.
7 6
Most courts do not require that the injured or ad-
verse party be the defendant. 77 Closure has been or-
dered upon the prosecutorial showing of a detrimen-
70 See Id. at 298-301.
71 Id.
7, Id. at 300.
72 Id. at 298-301.
"' While the obtrusive presence of the media often causes
much harm, defendants have asserted that its absence can also
violate their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In these
cases, the burden of producing a demonstrable harm remained
with the accused. However, courts have not found the presence
of the media to be an essential component in the fundamental
fairness of a trial. In Commonwealth v. Corderio, 519 N.E.2d
1328 (Mass. 1988), the defendant asserted that the exclusion of
the press from his trial extraneously influenced the jury and ad-
versely implicated the presumption of innocence on behalf of the
victim's testimony. The court found that the defendant failed to
carry his burden to produce a consequential harm. Id.
" Cross, 605 N.E.2d at 298-301.
76 Id.
71 See In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990) This child
custody proceeding generated a media frenzy. Due to the flood of
publicity, the guardian ad litem for the minor child asserted that
closure of the courtroom to the press and public would be in the
best interest of the girl. In balancing the public's interest in ope-
ness with the parties' interests in confidentiality, the Supreme
Court of Ohio concluded that, absent a statute, juvenile proceed-
ings were neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed
to the public and the press. The court may restrict access to trial
proceedings when a reasonable and substantial basis exists for
tal impact upon a witness or a victim giving
testimony before a court.7 8 Courts have constructed
safeguards to shield certain types of witnesses, such
as victims of sexual offenses, from "the glare of pub-
licity and tensions of being on camera.' ' 79
2. Expansion: Broadening the Scope of the Right
of Access
Although most states have opened their doors to
allow electronic media coverage of judicial proceed-
ings, the media has subtly tried to push the perime-
ters of its access and to relax the conditions upon
which its entry is based. In Smith v. State,8" the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas approved the media cover-
age, even though the mere presence of the cameras
constituted a "patent" error.8" The defendant ob-
jected to the presence of cameras, asserting that a
sentencing hearing was encompassed in the defini-
tion of "courtroom proceeding" as expressly stated in
the statute, thereby warranting exclusion.82 Al-
though the court indicated that an error was caused,
the defendant failed to make a sufficient record sup-
porting an allegation of a resulting harm sufficient to
warrant reversal.83
Several courts have heightened the standard of
proof required to show a substantial resulting harm.
In State v. Douglas,8" the defendant claimed that the
believing that the child could be harmed by public access. Id. See
also In re Katherine B., 189 N.E.2d. 443 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993)(basing the closure of a child protective proceeding upon
the negative effects on the victim's psychological and emotional
well-being); In re VV Publishing Corp., 120 N.J. 508
(1990)(weighing the strong legislative interests in protecting the
identities of minor victims of sexual offenses with the media's
interest in the case and holding that the media was entitled to
receive only redacted trial transcripts). See also Jean Montoya,
On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials. 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1259 (July 1992).
78 See supra note 77.
79 Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d at 443.
80 863 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1993).
81 Id. at 566-68.
82 Id. Although the majority did not specifically address the
issue, the concurrence reasoned that the coverage could be quali-
fied by clarifying the statutory language. The controlling statute,
an adaptation of Canon 3A(7), bars the "broadcasting of court-
room proceedings upon the objections from witnesses and parties
to the trial." Id.
83 Id. Despite the statutory violation, the court concluded
that the presence of the cameras did not have any effect upon the
adjudication of guilt or innocence, and did not threaten any
harm to the defendant's guaranteed right to a fair and impartial
trial. Id. at 453.
84 485 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1992).
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media interfered with attorney-client consultations
and violated his right to effective assistance of coun-
sel by placing microphones at the defense table."
The court found that the defendant failed to show
that he had been harmed by the presence of the me-
dia during his trial. Although the presence of the mi-
crophones was "clearly a nuisance" and created a
"real potential for prejudicing a defendant's constitu-
tional rights," the majority held that the defendant's
Due Process :rights were not violated.8" The court
based its decision on the absence of a resulting preju-
dicial harm to the defendant and the defendant's fail-
ure to demonstrate that counsel was impeded from
presenting an effective defense.
87
Although judges may exercise discretion when de-
ciding whether the right to access attaches to a par-
ticular case, they are required to articulate the rea-
sons underlying their decisions.88 A silent record
provides the appellate courts with no basis for deter-
mining the correctness of the exclusion. The require-
ment discourages arbitrary decisions.89
III. MEDIA ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS
Although many state courts have authorized media
access, the Supreme Court has repelled the broadcast
media's attempts to penetrate the walls of federal
courtrooms. In proscribing the parameters of accessi-
bility, the Court distinguishes the right to attend a
trial and to report its contents from the right of the
press to broadcast the actual proceedings from the
86 Id.
88 Id.
87 Id. The defense counsel asserted that the responsibility of
turning the microphones on and off, so as to avoid the disclosure
of confidential conversations while simultaneously trying to per-
form legal duties at trial, placed an undue burden on them. Id.
" See United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir.
1985).
89 Id.
0 There has been a general consensus by federal courts that
the ban on cameras from federal courtrooms is constitutional.
This exclusion is based upon constitutional scrutiny as "reasona-
ble and neutral, as with time, place, and manner restrictions."
Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17. See also Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581-82; Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976); United States v.
Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v.
CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 22 (App 2d Cir. 1984)(holding the right to
access does not constitute a right to view trials on a television
screen).
O' See Estes, 381 U.S. at 558 (holding no constitutional right
to televise judicial proceedings); Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1280
(holding television coverage is not constitutionally mandated just
because it is not constitutionally prohibited); United States v.
Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293, 1296 (1983)(holding there is a distinc-
courtroom." The Supreme Court has refused to in-
terpret the First Amendment as providing a constitu-
tional guarantee to televise courtroom proceedings.91
The prohibition of electronic media coverage does
not impede the right of the press to disseminate in-
formation acquired at trial; the media still may re-
port on the trial. 2 Despite the Court's unwavering
support of the ban, the press has continually strug-
gled to redefine the right to access to encompass the
televising of proceedings.
The favorable results of experiments with cameras
have encouraged states to allow the electronic media
to broadcast the proceedings.93 In contrast, the shield
protecting federal courtrooms has remained impene-
trable. The United States Judicial Conference quel-
led any expectations of removing the cloak by its re-
cent decision to uphold the mandatory exclusion of
the electronic media from federal courtrooms.
94
Upon the expiration of a three-year experiment with
media coverage in the federal court system, the Judi-
cial Conference voted to secure the ban on cameras
from both civil and criminal federal trials.9"
A. Background of the United States Judicial
Conference
The Judicial Conference of the United States is
the rulemaking body for the federal court system,
with the exception of the United States Supreme
Court.9 Presided over by the Chief Justice of the
United States, the Conference is composed of the
tion between the right to access and the right to attend, listen,
and report).
82 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569
(1976)(holding that the media is free to publish what transpired
at a public hearing); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947)(holding that the court cannot suppress, edit, or censor
events which transpire in proceedings); Times Publ. Co. v. State,
632 So. 2d 1072, 1074-5 (4th Cir. 1994)(holding that if the me-
dia gains access to the courtroom, there is no constitutional au-
thority to prevent the dissemination of the information acquired
and what they film).
" Piccus, supra note 63, at 1053.
9 Joan Biskupic, Vote on Cameras Reveals Judges Deep
Concern, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1994, at A3.
" The decision was announced at a press conference at the
Supreme Court on Sept. 21, 1994. David H. Sellars, spokesman
for the Judicial Conference, informed the press that the Confer-
ence had convened on the prior day and had voted, roughly two
to one, in favor of upholding the absolute ban. Although no pub-
lic explanation was given for the vote, Sellars said that "the
tenor of concern was the potential impact on witnesses and ju-
rors." Joan Biskupic, Federal Ban Continued, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1994, at A3.
96 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
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chief justices from each of the thirteen federal circuit
courts, district judges from twelve geographic dis-
tricts, and the chief judge from the Court of Interna-
tional Trade.97 The policymaking body proscribes,
modifies, or abrogates any rule or practice to "pro-
mote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administra-
tion, the just determination of litigation, and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."'"
The Chief Justice abstains from voting, except to
break a tie.9 '
In exercising the statutory duties, the Chief Jus-
tice must submit an annual report to Congress that
contains a record of the Conference's proceedings
and its recommendations for legislation. In 1967,
upon the recommendations of the Conference, Con-
gress created the Federal Judicial Center to further
develop the adoption of improved judicial adminis-
tration.' In 1988, the Judicial Conference ad-
dressed the increasing number of constitutional chal-
lenges to the ban on electronic media access to
courtroom proceedings by appointing a second Ad
Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom to re-
view recommendations that would allow access in
federal courtrooms.' 0 '
B. The Experiment
In September of 1990, the Judicial Conference ac-
97 Id.
88 Id.
99 Panel Bans Television Cameras From Federal Courts,
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1994, at A6.
100 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1994).
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES). In 1983, 28 news orga-
nizations petitioned the Judicial Conference to permit the pres-
ence of cameras in federal courtrooms. BROADCASTING, Oct. 3,
1988, at 23. In September of 1990, the Ad Hoc Committee re-
ceived a letter from U.S. Representative Robert Kastenmeier
(D-Wis.), then chairman of the House Judiciary's subcommittee
overseeing the federal courts, which implied that legislative ac-
tions would be compelled if the absolute ban was not lifted. See
Saundra Torry, Federal Courts to Experiment With Televised
Civil Trials, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1990, at A2.
10. See 1994 Report, supra note 14, at 4. The Ad Hoc Com-
mittee selected the U.S District Courts for the Southern District
of Indiana, District of Massachusetts, Eastern District of Michi-
gan, Southern District of New York, Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, and Western District of Washington, and the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits to partici-
pate in the pilot. Id.
104 Id. at 5. The Judicial Conference formulated a set of
mandatory guidelines. The guidelines:
(1) require reasonable advance notice of a request to cover
a proceeding; (2) prohibit photographing of jurors in the
cepted the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to authorize a pilot project to permit cameras
during civil trials in federal courts.'0 The blanket
ban that had suffocated federal courtrooms was tem-
porarily lifted by this judicial grant of consent. The
Ad Hoc Committee approved the procedural guide-
lines for the experiment and selected participants
from a pool of volunteers who were evaluated by
their size, civil caseload, and location to a metropoli-
tan area.' 03 The Judicial Conference Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management as-
sumed responsibility for the implementation and op-
eration of the experiment after dismissal of the Ad
Hoc Committee."0 4 The Federal Judicial Center
monitored the progression of the project and created
a research staff to study the feasibility and impact of
the cameras on trial proceedings.' Each pilot court
appointed an administrative liaison to record the
progression of the program, report relevant informa-
tion, and supervise the daily administration of the
pilot.'06 The pilot commenced on July 1, 1991 and
expired on December 31, 1994. '0
The study delved into the expectations, exper-
iences, and overall attitudes about media coverage of
the participating judges, attorneys, and media orga-
nizations.'0 The Committee monitored the exper-
iences by questionnaires and telephone interviews.' 9
Participating judges and attorneys were asked about
courtroom, in the jury deliberation room, or during re-
cesses; (3) allow only one television and one still camera
in trial courts (except for Southern District of New York,
which was permitted to allow two cameras in the court-
room) and two television cameras and one still camera in
appellate courts; and (4) require the media to establish
"pooling" arrangements when more than one media or-
ganization wants to cover a proceeding. The presiding
judge is empowered with the discretion to grant, refuse,
terminate, or restrict media coverage.
Id.
105 Id. at 50. The Center performs such services as develop-
ing and administering various education programs for nonjudi-
cial court personnel, judges, career court attorneys, and federal
defender office personnel. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629.
106 1994 Report, supra note 14, at 23.
107 Id. at 4 n.5.
108 Id. at 8. The experiences and attitudes of the participat-
ing jurors, witnesses, and parties were not evaluated in this
study. The Federal Judicial Center based the exclusion on their
minimal experiences with courtrooms and on their limited direct
involvement with the electronic media. Id.
100 Id. at 11-5. Prior to the commencement of the trial, ques-
tionnaires were sent to all the participating judges asking them
about their expectations. Judges were asked to rate the likeli-
hood of the potential harmful effects of the electronic media cov-
erage as opposed to conventional coverage. Id. at 11. Two fol-
low-up questionnaires were sent to the pilot judges after the first
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the potential positive and negative effects of the pres-
ence of cameras upon witnesses, jurors, judges,
courtroom decorum, and the fair administration of
justice."' The Committee examined the prejudicial
impact through an analysis of the content, use, and
presentation of televised material of the pilot to the
public through evening news broadcasts."' The po-
tential effects were evaluated and compared to simi-
lar studies in state courts."
2
C. The Results
Based upon its collection of data, the Federal Ju-
dicial Center found that "overall, the attitudes of
judges toward electronic media coverage of civil pro-
ceedings were initially neutral and became more
favorable after experience of the pilot.""' Judges
and attorneys who participated in the pilot reported
observing "small or no effects" of cameras upon the
and second years of the program. In addition to the same ques-
tions that were asked on the prior survey, the judges were asked
to comment on whether they experienced any of these potential
harmful effects. Id.
11 Judges were asked to rate the likely effect of cameras
upon witnesses (including witnesses' motivation to be truthful,
violation of privacy, willingness to appear in court, distraction,
and nervousness about testifying); jurors (including attentiveness,
sense of responsibility for the verdict, weight and importance
they give to certain witness testimony, influence they feel is
placed upon them by viewers); attorneys (including attorneys'
preparation for court, their presentation, manners and level of
courteousness); judges (including judges' attentiveness, tendency
to avoid unpopular decisions, and courteousness); and the court-
room proceedings (including the disruption caused and educa-
tional benefit given to the public). Id. at 14-15. Questionnaires
were mailed to the lead plaintiff and defense attorneys of 100
cases covered by electronic media. The 32 cases that received ex-
tended coverage were included in the sample. The remaining 68
were selected at random. The questionaires focused on the fol-
lowing issues:
(1) if the court adequately considered their views and
those of their clients in deciding whether to approve cover-
age requests; (2) whether potential witnesses refused to
testify because of the prospect of camera coverage; (3)
what effects of electronic media coverage affected the fair-
ness of the proceedings; (4) whether the electronic media
coverage affected the fairness of the proceedings; (5)
whether, overall, they favor electronic media coverage of
civil proceedings; and (6) whether their views toward elec-
tronic media coverage have changed as a result of partici-
pation in the program.
Id. at 18-19.
.. Id. at 31-32. To gage any modifications of attitudes, the
staff conducted telephone interviews with the judges who pos-
sessed the greatest amount of experience with media coverage,
representatives of media organizations, and the court staff re-
sponsible for the daily administration of the program. Id. at 11-
23.
trial participants, courtroom decorum, and the ad-
ministration of justice. " 4 Most of the justices who
were interviewed over the telephone thought that ed-
ucating the public about the workings of the federal
courts was the greatest potential benefit." 5 With the
exception of reports of "minor disruptions," the
court administrative liaisons expressed great satisfac-
tion with the operations of the pilot."' The content
of the pilot footage submitted for analysis indicated
that the majority of the information provided to
viewers involved the nature and facts of the case,
while only minimal information provided presented
about the legal process."
7
At the conclusion of their extensive study," 8 the
research project staff recommended that authoriza-
tion of camera access be expanded nationwide to civil
proceedings in federal courts of appeal and district
courts, subject to the proscribed guidelines." 9 Al-
though the application of the guidelines was satisfac-
At the outset of the pilot, participating media organizations
were required to provide the Federal Judicial Center with any
footage or photograph that was aired or published. The Ad Hoc
Committee gradually relaxed the guidelines and obtained footage
through a voluntary process. The material was used to examine
how courtroom footage was used in news stories, the type and
quality of information provided to viewers about a particular
case covered, and the quality of information that news stories
conveyed about the legal process. Id. at 28-30.
112 Id. at 38-42. The evaluation contains a summary of the
results from studies conducted in the state courts of Arizona,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. Id. at 40-
42.
113 Id. at 7.
114 Id. Out of the attorneys who responded to the surveys,
66% expressed that they somewhat or greatly favored the elec-
tronic media in civil cases, 21% were somewhat or greatly op-
posed to it, and 13% said they had no opinion. Id. at 7. Ninety-
seven out of the 109 attorneys said that cameras had no effect on
the overall fairness of the proceeding. Id. at 19-22.
15 Id. at 24.
le Id. at 31-2. The administrative liaisons estimated that
between 1-25% of their time was spent on the administration of
the program. Most found that the media cooperated and com-
plied fully with the guidelines. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 29. The media organizations set forth the following
criteria in deciding which trials to provide coverage for (in de-
scending order): (1) the "broad applicability" or "universal rele-
vance" of the subject matter; (2) the newsworthiness of the trial;
(3) the relevance of the story to local interests; and (4) the high
profile of the litigants involved. Id.
"8 Id. at 43. The recommendations presented to the Confer-
ence were those of the research project staff and not of the Fed-
eral Judicial Center or its Board.
119 Id. at 43-4. The staff recommended that a standard prac-
tice be adopted to inform counsel or a party appearing pro se
that an application for media coverage has been received. The
staff proposed a notice requirement to remedy the discontent of
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tory to the participants, the Staff suggested that
slight alterations concerning procedural matters and
court house facilities be made in order to make the
operation run more smoothly. 20
In September of 1994, the United States Judicial
Conference voted, roughly two to one, to uphold the
prohibition of the electronic media from all federal
courtrooms. A spokesman for the Conference, David
Sellars, announced at a press conference that the un-
derlying rationale for the decision was the poten-
tially negative effects upon jurors and witnesses. 2 '
The Conference debated for only twenty minutes
before it dismissed the recommendations of the re-
search staff and discarded the results of the three-
year pilot.
IV. BLOCKED ACCESS EQUALS
AMENDMENT VIOLATION
FIRST
The camera is the thirteenth juror, ensuring that
justice is being served by encouraging public scru-
tiny. Broadcasting enhances, not hinders, the admin-
istration of justice by fostering public confidence in
the judicial process. The televising of trial proceed-
ings enables viewers to witness the operations and to
receive a more accurate and comprehensive view of
the justice system. Many misconceptions about the
legal process are clarified by a heightened awareness
of important legal issues and enriched public discus-
sions. However, critics allege that defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial is jeopardized by the
surrogate role of the press to inform and by the
press' expansive First Amendment right to access.122
A. Disparity Between State and Federal Courts
With the massive infiltration of the media into
state courtrooms, cameras have become more of a
commonplace affair. Courts liberally construe vague
restrictions to impose a heavy burden upon the mov-
some of the participating attorneys who complained that they
were not informed of the media coverage prior to the trial hear-
ing. Id. at 43-4. The staff proposed that the guidelines of the
Conference remain in effect because of their workable nature
and broad grant of judicial discretion. Id. at 44-5.
120 For example, the staff proposes that media organizations
be invited to submit proposals for constructing and regulate the
use of permanent camera facilities in federal courtrooms. The
results of the study suggest that permanent installation of cam-
eras may be the "least intrusive" means of providing coverage.
Id. at 44-5 n.36.
121 See supra notes 94-100, and accompanying text.
122 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-92. In his con-
currence, Justice White emphasizes the significance of public
ing party to produce a demonstrable harm."2 8 The
scope of the media's right of access is widening, and,
often, is only denied upon a showing of a substantial
harm.124 However, statutory violations by the media
should not be ignored. The media's conduct should
be regulated, but its presence should not be denied.
Although many courts view the conduct and attitude
of the media as "disdainful," judges are usually only
prompted to verbally admonish, not sanction, the
press about their unruly conduct and the conditional
terms upon which its right to access is founded. 2
Studies indicate that the presence of the electronic
media in courtrooms neither adversely affects partici-
pants to the proceedings nor disrupts the solemnity
of the courtroom decorum nor interferes with the fair
administration of justice. Despite these findings, a
disparity still remains between the federal and state
court systems concerning their policies of
accessibility.
Upon the termination of the experiment with the
electronic media in the federal court system, the
United States Judicial Conference reaffirmed its ex-
clusionary policy of barring the media from federal
courtrooms.' 6 The Conference engaged in a twenty
minute discussion before it rejected the recommenda-
tion of the researchers to permanently extend cover-
age to civil trials in federal courts. 27 In light of the
brief period of time in which the Conference contem-
plated the results of the commissioned study, the
question arises as to why the Conference ever au-
thorized the pilot. This may have been a ploy by the
Justices to alleviate themselves of constant pressure
from citizen groups and from subtle threats by legis-
lators, and to discourage futile constitutional chal-
lenges from being waged in the courtroom.
Although the potential impact upon jurors is of-
fered as the primary reason for the decision, the con-
clusion is inconsistent with the results of the
study.128 Most of the participants were pleased with
their experience and found "no or little effect" of the
character of trials that has remained throughtout history. He in-
dicates that "[n]o aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more
rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people
through free and open debate." Id. at 588 n.3 (quoting Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
122 See, e.g., Smith, 863 S.W. 2d at 566-68.
124 See discussion, supra part II.
2' See Douglas, 485 N.W.2d at 619 (holding that the de-
fendant failed to make a specific record to demonstrate the harm
produced by the media's presence).
126 See Biskupic, supra note 94 at A3.
127 Id.
128 In response to the Conference's decision, Stephen Brill,
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electronic media coverage upon jurors. Therefore,
the question remains unanswered as to what princi-
ple the Conference is relying upon to support the bar
and to justify the distinction between state and fed-
eral courts.
Critics reason that the disparity in treatment of
the electronic media by the respective court systems
lies with the duration of judicial appointments.2 9
State judges are elected officials, in comparison to
federal judges who receive lifetime appointments.
Therefore, it is argued that the media coverage
serves as an additional check on elected officials to
ensure the appropriate exercise of their judicial du-
ties and to deter deviation from established legal
standards. 3 ° Allowing the constituency to peer
through the-lens of the camera and into the court-
room establishes a safeguard against corruption and
judicial abuse of power. Exposure to unblinking eye
of the camera enables the public to monitor the per-
formance of the judges in their adjudicative duties
and to make an informed vote."'
This argument is valid, yet it fails to recognize the
importance of providing a similar check on the fed-
eral court system. A lifetime appointment does not
justify exclusion from the roving eye of the camera
or the scrutinizing eye of the public. The additional
safeguard may be necessitated by the greater risk of
judicial misuse of power existing in the federal sys-
tem. Federal judges have less incentive to abstain
from improprieties because they cannot be voted out
of office.
The goal of the trial system is the fair administra-
tion of justice. The significance of this objective is
not dependent upon jurisdiction. The severity of an
offense nor the public's interest in seeing the fair ad-
ministration of justice is not lessened in a state court
system rather than a federal court system. By up-
holding a bright line of demarcation, the Court sub-
tly suggests that there is a greater significance to the
founder of Court TV, said that there there was great irony in
the decision because "[tlhe judges threw out their own evidence."
Panel Bans TV Cameras From Federal Courtrooms, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1994, at A6.
" Piccus, supra note 63 at 1068-72.
180 See Harris, supra, note 3, at 794.
11 Id. at 794-5. Cameras may present judges of state courts
with the temptation to exploit the media coverage as a campaign
device or political tool, and to buckle under constituent pressure
by refraining from making unpopular decisions. Id.
132 Id. at 785.
.. Court TV provides 24-hour live and taped coverage of
criminal and civil trials and legal news, supplemented by report-
ing and legal commentary on 700 cable systems serving 14.1 mil-
lion subscribers. Basic Cable Services, 1 BROADCASTING AND
federal court system which warrants the mandatory
closure. The trial processes of both state and federal
governments share the common objective to ascertain
the truth and to ensure that justice is served. A dis-
tinction made upon jurisdictional grounds is
unfounded.
Judges serve as impartial officers of the court.
They are vested with the responsibility to uphold the
law and to ensure judicial integrity. It should not be
presumed that their attention will divert from the
trial at hand when presented with the opportunity to
make a sound bite or a campaign pitch for re-elec-
tion. We need to have more faith in our legal system
than to assume that judges would arbitrarily jeop-
ardize a defendant's constitutional right for their
personal whims and expectations. It is this lack of
respect and confidence in the justice system that can
be eradicated by granting access. Unlocking the
doors the federal court system would not dictate
mandatory openness. It would vest faith in the jus-
tice system and in its officers to ensure the fair ad-
ministration of justice. It is not the public's access to
information that we should restrict, but the conduct
of the press in its delivery to the public.
B. Court TV: An Educational Vehicle?
The image of the legal system has been distorted
by a saturation of crime shows and "infotainments"
in combination with the public's inexperience with
the law."' This misconception was partially reme-
died in July of 1991, when the Courtroom Televi-
sion Network, ("Court TV"), hit the airwaves, pro-
viding the viewing public with "gavel-to-gavel"
coverage of criminal and civil trials from across the
nation."' Court TV is the first television station
dedicated to covering legal news and issues." 4 The
network was immediately thrust into the spotlight
when it provided live coverage of the William Ken-
CABLE YEARBOOK, 158(1994).
134 Kavanau v. Courtroom Television Network, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1938 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1992). In 1992, Ted
Kavanau, a 30-year veteran of the cable and television industry,
alleged that he originally thought of the idea for the channel and
conceptualized a twenty- four hour cable station with a mainstay
of live broadcasts throughout the United States. He brought an
action for damages against the Courtroom Television Network et
al., and claimed relief against the defendants for theft of crea-
tion, unfair competition and misappropriation, unlawful and tor-
tious interference with prospective economic retaliations and ad-
vantage, and for denial of business opportunity. The court
granted summary judgment for the defendants upon the finding
that Kavanau's idea was not a novel one. Id. at 1938-44.
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nedy Smith trial. " ' Court TV has developed a
strong and loyal following of viewers ever since.186
Programmers must determine which trials have
merit and are worthy of coverage. " 7 Court TV ex-
amines the trials according to five criteria: (1) public
interest in the case; (2) notoriety and newsworthiness
of the case and the participants; (3) quality of the
story; (4) educational value of the case; and (5) dura-
tion of the case."'
Viewers are given the opportunity to silently
watch the entire trial, and to learn about fundamen-
tal principles and substantive issues of law. Court
TV can be used as an educational tool that enhances
the understanding of the courts and the Constitution,
and their respective significance. This enrichment
encourages public debate and introduces significant
legal issues into the public forum." 9
Although its broadcasts provide viewers with a
more accurate picture of the formalities and legalities
of an actual courtroom trial, Court TV's program-
ming is not entirely representative of the justice sys-
tem. It is not an absolute safeguard against public
conceptions. Critics assert that the cable network is
misleading by "glamorizing litigation" in its creation
of an image that the trial is the "center of the legal
universe," ignoring the reality that few trials are ul-
timately resolved in a court of law, but instead are
settled out of court. 140
Opponents challenge the network's ability to pre-
sent an accurate view of the justice system and claim
that the parties rights are sacrificed for viewing en-
tertainment.14' Although the broadcasts of actual tri-
als are unedited, programmers have editing power in
deciding which trials to televise. The ignorance of
the trial tracking process creates the misguided im-
pression that most trials resolve around such serious
and sensationalistic issues as murder and rape. " 2 In
its quest for financial backing, Court TV has admit-
135 In 1991, the nation became mesmerized by the rape trial
of William Kennedy Smith. The media blitz compelled the trial
judge to prohibit all of the participants in the trial from making
any public statement concerning the case. See State v. Smith, 91-
5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991). However, this order did not
impede the media's attempts to feed the the public's veracious
appetite for sensationalism by exploiting any persons who were
somehow related to the case, such as old college roommates.
While Smith was tried before a jury, the characters of both the
alleged victim and the defendant were tried before the public.
Robert S. Stephen, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal
Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do To Ensure a Fair Trial in
the Face of a Media Circus, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1063,
1078-80 (1992).
I6 Subscriber growth has skyrocketed from 4 million view-
ers in July of 1991 to 14.4 million viewers in 1993. Subscriber
ted to advertising its programming as a cross be-
tween C-Span and a soap opera." However, the
network's financial objectives do not diminish its
value as an educational tool to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
A camera in a courtroom becomes a thirteenth ju-
ror, ensuring the fair administration of justice. It
provides an opportunity for the public to peer
through the windows into the trial process and to re-
ceive a more comprehensive understanding about the
justice system. The camera is an educational device
informing the public about procedural and substan-
tive issues of law and encouraging enriched debate.
Although the electronic media has successfully
eroded many of the barriers to state courtrooms, it
has failed to erase the line of demarcation that ostra-
cizes it from the federal court system. The unblink-
ing eye of the camera serves as an addtional safe-
guard against judicial impropriety and increases
public confidence. Judges, whether they serve in
state or in federal courtrooms, are vested with the
duty to preserve the fair administration of justice.
Federal court judges should not be isolated from the
roving eye of the camera merely because of their life
time appointment to the bench. As officers of the
court, judges are empowerea to exercise their sound
discretion to preserve the rights of the parties.
Studies have indicated that the presence of the
electronic media has no major negative impacts upon
witnesses and jurors. The justifications for the exclu-
sionary policy that have been entrenched in the fed-
eral system no longer exist. The day has arrived for
the disparity between state and federal court systems
to be eliminated. The absolute ban that has cloaked
Growth Chart (COURT TV 1993).
'3 See Harris, supra note 3, at 805.
138 Id. at 797, 818-20.
'39 Id. at 805. Many important social issues, such as dcmes-
tic violence, date rape, and child custody have emerged in the
public forum by means of televised trials. For example, the Wil-
liam Kennedy Smith rape trial and the O.J. Simpson murder
trial attracted immense public attention, especially when
televised.
140 Id. at 823-24.
141 Id. at 805-15. See also Court Experts See Good Bad in
TV Camera's Eye, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 16, 1994.
"* Harris, supra note 3, at 805-20.
's Francis Murphy, A Case Against Cameras in Court-
rooms, N.Y. L. J. June 30, 1994 at 2.
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the federal court system for sixty years should be
lifted allowing courts to open their doors to the elec-
tronic media.
